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BMS ENTERTAINMENT/HEAT MUSIC LLC V.
BRIDGES: HOW THE COURT GOT IT WRONG
... JUST LIKE THAT
1. INTRODUCTION
In BMS Entertainment/Heat Music LLC v. Bridges, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
examined whether lyrics that combine a call-and-response format,
the phrase "like that" preceded by a one-syllable word ("straight"
in plaintiffs' work and "just" in defendants' work), and a rhythmic
pattern consisting of three notes--an eighth note, a quarter note,
and an eighth note-were sufficiently original to warrant copyright
protection.1 Historically, courts have viewed common phrases as
uncopyrightable.2  In BMS Entertainment/Heat Music LLC v.
Bridges ("BMS"), however, the Southern District of New York
signaled a possible change in the court's view of whether or not a
phrase within the context of music is copyrightable and can
1. BMS Entertainment/Heat Music LLC v. Bridges, No. 04 Civ. 2584, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13491 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2005).
2. See e.g. Boone v. Jackson, No. 03-CV- 8661, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13172, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2005) (noting that "[i]t is black letter law that
common phrases such as 'Holla Back' are not protectable."); see also Jean v.
Bug Music, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3176, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2002)
(noting that "[c]ommon phrases are generally not protected by copyright."); see
generally Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 289, 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that "[a]s a well-worn cliche or motto, the 'ordinary'
phrase may be freely quoted or otherwise used without fear of infringement.");
see generally Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 155 F.3d 140, 144 (2d
Cir. 1998) (referring to the district court's determination that the lines in
plaintiffs song lacked the requisite originality to warrant protection because of
the widespread popular use of the phrase.); see also Stratchborneo v. Arc Music
Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1395, 1405 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (noting that "[i]ndeed,
common phrases are generally not susceptible to copyright protection.").
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receive copyright protection. In BMS, the district court denied
defendants' motion for summary judgment.3 However, one week
prior, in Boone v. Jackson, the same court, using the ordinary
observer test in a copyright infringement case, determined that
summary judgment for defendant was appropriate because "[t]he
presence of the phrase 'holla back,' rapped in an eighth note, [an]
eighth note, [and] [a] quarter note rhythmic pattern in the hook of
each song[,] [was] too common to be protectable."4 How can these
two cases, by the same court, be reconciled? Did the court in BMS
reach the wrong decision?
This article examines BMS in light of the Southern District
Court of New York's previous decision in Boone v. Jackson
decided one week earlier. After providing some background in
copyright law, the evolution of the creation of music, and cultural
integration into music in Section II, this article describes the BMS
case in Section III. The article then examines the district court's
approach in resolving the copyright infringement issue in Section
IV. Section IV (A) shows that the court's approach to resolving
the issue deviated from the standard approach used when
evaluating works that contain protectable and unprotectable
elements. Section IV (B) then examines the approach used by the
district court; and Section IV (C) shows why it was an
inappropriate test in this case. The article also discusses that the
court fails to reach the specific issue of BMS because the court
uses the wrong approach. Because BMS deviates from the
previous standards expressed by the Southern District of New
York, this article also discusses the impact of the BMS decision.
Section V concludes with a recommendation on which approach
courts should use when analyzing works that contain protected and
unprotected components.
3. BMS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13491, at *3.
4. Boone, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13172, at *12.
312
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Copyright Law
Copyright law finds its origins in the Constitution. Article I,
section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution, commonly known as the
Copyright Clause, "grants Congress the power 'to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their Respective
Writings and Discoveries."'" The Copyright Clause "provides
Congress with the power to grant a limited monopoly through
copyrights or patents to authors or inventors for their particular
writings and inventions."6  Title 17 of the United States Code
("Copyright Act") gives further guidance to the copyright law in
the United States.7 In order to qualify for copyright protection,
works of authorship must be of: (1) copyrightable subject matter;
(2) original; and (3) fixed in a tangible medium of expression.8
Copyrightable subject matter includes derivative works, which are
works that are based upon one or more preexisting works.9
However, copyright protection does not extend to any part of the
5. Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (2004)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005).
8. Id. at § 102(a); see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J. C. Bach to Hip
Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV.
547, 565-66 (2006). Stating that:
Originality thus serves as the minimum threshold for
copyrightability. Although a musical work must demonstrate
some originality to receive copyright protection, the required
amount of originality is not defined statutorily. It is, however,
discussed extensively in case law. Cases and commentary do
not consistently define what constitutes an original musical
work. One core element that runs across many definitions is
that originality requires an independent creation, which
essentially appears to rule out or significantly limit borrowing.
Id.
9. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103.
20061 313
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work that uses preexisting copyrighted material unlawfully."l The
copyright in derivative works extends only to the new material the
author contributes."
Section 106 of the Copyright Act specifies a copyright owner's
rights. 2  A copyright owner has the exclusive right: (1) to
reproduce the copyrighted work; (2) to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies for the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; (5) to display the copyrighted work
publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission. 3 However, there are limitations on the exclusive
rights that the Copyright Act provides.14
One such limitation is the fair use doctrine. 5 Copyrighted
works may be used and even reproduced without the copyright
owner's permission if the use falls under the fair use doctrine of
section 107 of the Copyright Act. 6 In determining whether the use
made of a work was fair, courts look at four main factors: (1) the
purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work or the
value of the copyrighted work. 17
Copyright protection for works created after January 1, 1978,
lasts for a term of the life of the author plus seventy years after the
author's death.' 8 In the case of joint works, copyright protection
10. Id. at § 103.
11. Id.
12. Id. at § 106.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
16. Id. (noting that "[t]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use
by reproduction in copies or phonorecords . . . for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright")).
17. Id.
18. Id. at § 302(a).
314
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lasts for a term of seventy years after the life of the last surviving
author's death. 9  Although registration is not a condition of
copyright protection, registration is required in order to sue for
copyright infringement. z In order to register a copyright, an
author is required to deposit the. work, complete an application,
and pay the requisite fee to the Copyright Office.2 ' Once the
Register of Copyrights determines that the work is of
copyrightable subject matter and all other legal and formal
requirements of the Copyright Act are met, the Copyright Office
issues a certificate of registration.2  The effective date of the
copyright registration is the day the application, fee, and deposit
are all received by the Copyright Office. 23 Copyright registration
is also a requirement in a copyright infringement suit if the
plaintiff seeks statutory damages or attorney's fees. 4 In order to
receive an award for statutory damages or attorney's fees, the
copyright owner must have registered the work: (1) prior to the act
of copyright infringement; or (2) within three months of first
publication; or (3) one month after the copyright owner learned of
19. Id. at § 302(b). The Copyright Act defines a joint work as "a work
prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." Id. at §
101.
20. Id. at § 408(a), 411(b).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 408.
22. Id. at § 410(a).
23. Id. at § 410(d).
24. Id. at § 412. Stating that:
an action for infringement of the copyrighted work that has
been preregistered . . . before the commencement of the
infringement and that has an effective date of registration not
later than the earlier of 3 months after the first publication of
the work or 1 month after the copyright owner has learned of
the infringement . . . no award of statutory damages or of
attorney's fees ... shall be made for- (1) any infringement of
copyright in an unpublished work commenced before the
effective date of its registration; or (2) any infringement of
copyright commenced after first publication of the work and
before the effective date of its registration, unless such
registration is made within three months after the first
publication of the work.
2006] 315
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the infringement.25
Only the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a
copyright is entitled to institute an action for copyright
infringement of that particular right.26 In order to establish
copyright infringement, the plaintiff must prove: (1) ownership of
a valid copyright and (2) unauthorized copying of a copyrighted
work.27  A registration from the United States Register of
Copyrights constitutes primafacie evidence of the valid ownership
of a copyright.28 In order to satisfy the second element of an
infringement claim, a plaintiff must "show that his work was
'actually copied' and that the portion copied amounts to an
improper or unlawful appropriation. Copying may be
established by indirect evidence because evidence of actual
copying is difficult to obtain.3" Accordingly, copying will be
inferred if a plaintiff can show: (1) defendant had access to the
copyrighted work and (2) that there are substantial similarities
between defendant's work and the protectable elements of
plaintiff's work.3 "Proof of actual copying may also include
weighing expert testimony. 3 2  "Expert testimony may include
'dissecting' the two works and discussing the works' relationship
to earlier works, for the purpose of illuminating whether
similarities between the two works are more likely due to copying
or independent creation."33  Plaintiff must show that substantial
similarities exist between the two works and that these substantial
similarities indicate copying which amounts to an improper or
unlawful appropriation.34
25. Id.
26. Id. at § 501(b).
27. Boone v. Jackson, No. 03-CV-8661, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13172, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2005).
28. Id. at *7-8; accord 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
29. Boone, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13172, at *8 (quoting Castle Rock
Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998)).
30. Id.
31. Id. at *8-9.
32. Id at *9.
33. Id at *9 (quoting McDonald v. Multimedia Entm't, Inc., No. 90-CV-
6356, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10649, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1991)).
34. Id.
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Courts utilize the ordinary observer test, which asks "whether an
'ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities,
would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic
appeal as the same"' to establish unlawful appropriation.35
"Additionally, when determining 'substantial similarity,' the finder
of fact is constrained to look at the work as a whole, without
dissection as an ordinary observer would."36  However, an
extraction method must be employed where works are compared
that contain both protectable and unprotectable elements.37 The
unprotectable elements must be extracted from consideration in
order to determine if the protectable elements, standing by
themselves, are substantially similar.38  A finding of no
infringement would be appropriate if points of dissimilarity
between the two works exceed the points that are similar.39 Also,
once a plaintiff makes a successful showing of a prima facie case
of copyright infringement, evidence of independent creation may
be used as an affirmative defense and to rebut the claim of
infringement."
35. Boone, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13172, at *9 (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics,
Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)).
36. Id. at *10 (quoting Tienshan, Inc., v. C.C.A. Int'l, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 651,
658 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
37. Id. at*10.
38. Id. This is called the extraction test. It is worth noting courts also refer
to this as dissection. See, e.g., Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money
Records, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. 6843, at*6-8 (E.D. La. April 21, 2003).
39. Boone, 2005 U.S. dist. LEXIS 13172, at *10.
40. Id. at *10-11; see generally Vargas v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24874, at *12 (Oct. 26, 2005); see also Santrayll v. Burrell, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3538, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. March 25, 1996). See BMS, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13491, at *5. (In BMS, defendants did not dispute that plaintiffs had a
valid registered copyright and that defendants had access to plaintiffs'
composition. However, defendants would have probably made a better defense
if they had argued that their composition was independently created.
Defendants' assertion of independent creation would likely have been a
successful affirmative defense to rebut the claim of infringement in the BMS
case. Nowhere in the case did plaintiffs prove that defendants had access to
their composition. Unless defendants had actually heard plaintiffs' composition,
access could have been a material issue of fact. Defense counsel's acquiescence
of that important fact was likely a mistake that led to the denial of defendants'
motion for summary judgment.).
2006] 317
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B. The Evolution of the Creation of Music
The way in which music is created has drastically changed over
the past thirty years. Computer technology has become a
dominant tool in the music industry and quickly changed the way
music is created.4' Digital sampling has become an integral part of
modem popular music, especially in rap, hip-hop, electronic dance
music, and rock music.42 Digital sampling computer technologies
allow users to obtain short digital recordings, commonly known as
samples, of any sound and reuse that sound in a new musical
composition.43 Samples of vocal and/or instrumental performances
can be taken from live musical performances or sound
recordings.44 Digital sampling technologies also enable users to
manipulate the pitch, tone, melody, and speed of the recorded
sample. 5
Therefore, users of digital sampling technology may take an
artist's unique vocal performance or a musician's distinguishable
instrumental delivery and re-create it exactly the way it was
performed by the previous artist in a new work, or the sampling
technology user may alter the sampling recording and use a
manipulated version of the previous artist's performance in the
new composition.46 Because there are endless possibilities for
producers to create new works based upon manipulating samples,
many modem music producers are drawn to digital sampling
computer technology. However, sampling technology is not
merely appealing because of its creative utility; it is also appealing
because of its cost effectiveness.48 Digital sampling allows users
41. E. Scott Johnson, Note, Protecting Distinctive Sounds: The Challenge of
Digital Sampling, 2 J.L. & TECH. 273,273 (1987).
42. Carlos Ruiz de la Torre, Seventh Annual Entertainment Law Initiative
Essay Competition: Digital Music Sampling and Copyright Law: Can the
Interests of Copyright Owners and Sampling Artists Be Reconciled?, 7 VAND. J.
ENT. L. & PRAC. 401, 401 (2005).
43. Johnson, supra note 41, at 273.
44. Id. at 274.
45. Id. at 273-74; see also Ruiz de la Torre, supra note 42, at 401.
46. Johnson, supra note 41, at 274.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 275.
8
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to re-create sounds with minimal cost, instead of hiring musicians
and vocalists, and paying for recording studio time to reproduce
the sounds.49
Digital sampling appears to be a music creator's dream. For
non-commercial music creators, it is. Because current copyright
infringement tests relating to sampling are unclear, however,
digital sampling users must be careful." The Sixth Circuit has
interpreted the Copyright Act to require the users of digital sample
of a copyrighted works in a derivative work to obtain a license
from the sound recording copyright holder to avoid copyright
infringement." However, "the current procedure for obtaining
licenses involves considerable administrative (time) and financial
costs."52  Usually, licenses must be obtained for the sound
recording and the underlying musical composition. 3 This leads
some digital sample users to make the decision not to seek a
license. 4
Generally, when an artist uses a sample without receiving a
49. Id.
50. Id. at 402; see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792
(6th Cir. 2005) (creating a bright-line rule that precludes the use of the
substantial similarity test or de minimis test in copyright infringement cases
concerning the digital sampling of sound recordings because of the court's
interpretation of the language in 17 U.S.C. § 114(b)).
51. See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801. While the Sixth Circuit ruled that
sampling any portion of a pre-existing sound recording would constitute
copyright infringement of the original work, even if the sample is digitally
altered and/or brief, the Ninth Circuit has disagreed. Stan Soocher, Hot Topics
in Entertainment Law: Recent Court Decisions in 826 PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 435, 444-45 (2005). In Newton v. Diamond, 349
F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003), the court of appeals ruled that, after separating
plaintiffs sound recording and plaintiffs musical composition, the sample used
by defendants of the plaintiffs musical composition was de minimis and
therefore not copyright infringement. Id. In that case, defendants had obtained
a license to use the sound recording, however, plaintiff filed suit over the use of
the underlying musical composition. Id.
52. Ruiz de la Torre, supra note 42, at 402.
53. Id.
54. Id. Flat fees for licenses range from $100 to over $10,000. Id. Royalties
to recording owners can range from half a cent to three cents per copy of the
track sold. Id.
20061
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license, fair use or the de minimis test may be used as an
affirmative defense. 5 The de minimis defense embodies the
proposition that trivial use of copyrighted material does not
constitute infringement. 6 In determining whether a use is de
minimis, courts look at whether an ordinary observer would find
"substantial similarity" between the copyrighted work and the new
work or "whether the 'quantitative or qualitative' appropriation of
the elements of the original recording are significant."57 In the fair
use defense, as discussed above, courts look to four factors to
determine whether the use of the copyrighted work without
permission is justified in order to serve one of the desired social
purposes delineated in section 107 of the Copyright Act. 8
C. Cultural Integration into Music
Modem music has integrated the world and the culture in which
we live. All music contains some words, phrases, and
colloquialisms that speak directly to its intended audience.
Sometimes that audience is generational; however, many times
that audience is cultural. When listening to "Reggaeton" music,
which combines Latin music, Caribbean music, and hip hop, many
times the lyrics are mainly in Spanish. 9 Yet non-Spanish speakers
have become a part of that genre's market due to generational
appreciation, not only for Reggaeton's cultural roots, but also for
the music itself.6 As we become a more integrated society, racial,
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See supra text accompanying note 14.
59. See generally David Tamayo, REGGAETON SLANG DICTIONARY,
http://www.reggaetonline.net/reggaeton-dictionary.php (last visited Feb. 12,
2006) (containing further information on Reggaeton music).
60. Although WIKIPEDIA is not generally an academic source, the use of
WIKIPEDIA is appropriate here because the subject matter is urban culture and
urban culture is constantly evolving from contributions from the public.
Therefore, the information found on WIKIPEDIA is appropriate because that
information is elicited directly from the people that comprise urban culture. See
Reggaeton, W1KIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA (2001) at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reggaeton (last visited Feb. 12, 2006) (containing
information on Reggaeton music).
10
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ethnic, and cultural lines become blurred.6'
Cultural integration has changed society's understanding of
what it means to be a member of a given racial or ethnic group.
We now share common forms of slang. For example, language
that was once dubbed Ebonics and was solely attributed to
African-Americans has transformed into "urban speech" used by
all.62 An online dictionary of this urban speech was created to help
translate communications between individuals. 63  That dictionary
was cited as an authority in Boone v. Jackson to prove that "holla
back" was a common urban phrase. 64  However, some of these
"common urban phrases" might be considered original, but how
original is difficult to determine. Another question is how much
use does a phrase need to have in order for it to be common
enough to fall in the public domain? It is unlikely that a bright-
line rule could ever be established to answer this question. Yet
BMS deals not only with the way in which urban music is created,
but also the components of urban music. 65 How should we look at
the phrase "like that," which is proceeded by a one-syllable word?
Is it the same? Does it mean the same thing? Is it similar enough?
Reggaeton has allowed the Spanish Carribean youth,
specifically those of Puerto Rico and Dominican Republic, as
well as the Latin American and United States Latino
communities, to have a musical genre as a voice. More
recently, it has become an international movement with the
help of many from New York's Latino and Black hip hop
community.
Id.
61. See WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA (2001) at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bi-racial#Two millionmixed-
raceAmericans vanish (last visited Feb. 12, 2006) ("The 2000 US Census
recorded 6.8 million mixed-race people.").
62. See generally URBAN DICTIONARY at http://www.urbandictionary.com
(last visited Feb. 12, 2006) (defining words used in an urban context). An
individual may post his or her own meanings to common phrases as well. This
allows the online resource to expand to cover a wide selection of words and
definitions used in urban speech. Id.
63. Id.
64. Boone v. Jackson, No. 03-CV-8661, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13172, at
*13 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2005).
65. BMS Entertainment/Heat Music LLC v. Bridges, No. 04 Civ. 2584, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13491 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2005).
2006]
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Is it original enough for copyright protection? These are very
difficult questions to answer.
III. STATEMENT OF BMS ENTERTAINMENT/HEAT Music LLC v.
BRIDGES
In BMS Entertainment/Heat Music LLC v. Bridges, plaintiffs,
Ramid Brown, Theodore Green, Ronique Thomas, and Aldeen
Wilson, are members of a rap group that performs and records
under the name "It's Only Family."66 Plaintiffs, as well as BMS,
are the copyright owners of the musical composition "Straight
Like That."67 The defendants include recording and distribution
entities as well as Christopher Bridges, an artist who records and
performs under the name Ludacris.68 Plaintiffs filed suit against
the defendants and alleged that the defendant's composition
"Stand Up" infringed on their copyright in "Straight Like That."69
Defendants moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims.7"
Defendants argued that key sections in plaintiffs' composition
were unoriginal and, therefore, not copyrightable.7' Defendants
further asserted that after the unprotected elements of Plaintiffs'
composition were removed from consideration, there was no
substantial similarity between Plaintiffs' song "Straight Like That"
and the defendants' song "Stand Up."72
66. Id. at *2.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. BMS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13491, at *2.
72. Id. at *2. The court stated that:
'[i]n a call-and-response phrase, the two parts: the call and the
response, must be understood in tandem, together making one
phrase or hook.' In 'Straight Like That,' lyrics such as, 'You
get it on and poppin,' constitute the 'call,' to which the
response is 'straight like that.' In the defendants' song, 'Stand
Up,' the lyrics, 'When I move you move' serve as the 'call,'
to which the response is 'just like that.' [B]oth 'Straight Like
That' and 'Stand Up' utilize a three-note rhythmic pattern
comprised of an eighth note, quarter note, and eighth note
12
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment.73
The court found that it could not rule, as a matter of law, that a
composition combining a call-and-response format, the phrase
"like that" preceded by a one-syllable word, and a rhythmic pattern
consisting of three notes - an eighth note, a quarter note, and an
eighth note - lacked originality and therefore could not be
protected by copyright.74 The court further found that it could not
conclude, as a matter of law, that the portions of the parties'
compositions were not substantially similar.75
Defendants then moved for reconsideration of the denial of
defendants' motion for summary judgment.76 The district court
denied the motion.77 The court noted that central to its decision
was Knitwaves v. Lollytogs Ltd.78 The district court again rejected
defendants' assertion that when comparing designs for copyright
infringement, the court was required to dissect the designs "into
separate components, and compare only those elements which are
in themselves copyrightable."79  The district court reiterated its
decision to follow Knitwaves, emphasizing that the case supports
the proposition that common, uncopyrightable elements,
unprotectable in isolation, may constitute a protectible work when
those uncopyrightable elements are combined.8" The court then
accompanying the respective lyrics 'straight like that' and
'just like that.'
Id. at *7-8.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Article, From JC. Bach to Hip
Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C.L. REV. 547,
645 n.77 (2006).
75. BMS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13491, at *2.
76. BMS Entertainment/Heat Music LLC v. Bridges, No. 04 Civ. 2584, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24449, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2005).
77. Id.
78. Id. at *3-4.
79. Id. at *4.
80. Id. at *5. However, in an earlier case, the same court found that while
"'initial focus should be placed on music and lyrics taken together' [that] does
not establish that unprotectable elements combined are per se protectible." Jean
v. Bug Music, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3176, at *20-21 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25,
2002) (quoting Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1405
2006]
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addressed Knitwaves' "total concept and feel" standard as it related
to works with protectable and non-protectable component parts.8'
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF BMS
The district court wrongly decided BMS Entertainment/Heat
Music LLC v. Bridges. In doing so, the court ignored black letter
law that phrases are not copyrightable because the court's ruling
implies that common urban phrases such as "like that," in
combination with any other word, becomes protectable.82 The
district court also erred in its analysis on the issue of whether
lyrics that combine a call-and-response format, the phrase "like
that" preceded by a one-syllable word, and a rhythmic pattern
consisting of three notes - an eighth note, a quarter note, and an
eighth note - were sufficiently original to warrant copyright
protection. Judges and juries do not have any guidelines "when
they're asked to answer substantial [] similarity questions in music
copyright cases ... [because] such cases force judges and juries to
act as music critics and music historians to reach their decisions."83
Because rap artists often take the language of the street and turn it
into songs that may be similar to the work of another performer,
rap music has become the battleground for these copyright
disputes.84 Unfortunately, the courts do not have a good formula
for dealing with these types of cases.85
A. The Court Failed To Apply the Extraction Test
As mentioned earlier, in order to establish copyright
infringement, a plaintiff must prove two elements: "(1) ownership
of a valid copyright and (2) copying of constituent elements of the
(S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
81. Id.
82. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
83. John Council, FIFTH CIRCUIT RULES IN BATTLE OVER RAP PHRASE, ENT.
L. & FIN., Feb. 2, 2005, at 3 (quoting Siva Vaidhyanathan, an assistant professor
of culture and communication at New York University and author of the book,
Copyrights and Copywrongs).
84. Id.
85. Id.
324
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work that are original. 8 6 Under the second element of the Feist
test, "'copying []' involves two prongs: access and substantial
similarity."87 Courts have developed two main approaches when
evaluating whether two works are substantially similar.88 These
approaches are referred to as the "extraction test" and the
"ordinary observer test."8 9 The extraction test is an integral part of
a copyright infringement action when the works that are compared
contain protectable and unprotectable elements.9" The
unprotectable elements must be extracted to determine if the
protectable elements, standing alone, are substantially similar.9
86. Winn v. Opryland Music Group, Inc., 22 F. App'x 728, 729 (Nov. 1,
2001) (quoting Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 341
(1991)).
87. Id.
88. Jeffrey P. Cunard and Bruce P. Keller, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE
COPYRIGHT LAW § 11:6.2 (June 2005).
89. Id. The main difference between the two tests concerns the subject
matter that the fact-finder looks to in determining whether or not two works are
substantially similar. Id. Under the ordinary observer test, the court compares
the works as a whole, including the unprotectable elements, and "asks whether
the infringing work has captured the 'total concept and feel' of the original from
the viewpoint of an 'ordinary observer."' Id. While the "ordinary observer" test
usually involves a lay observer's perspective, one court has held that in cases
where the intended audience possesses specialized expertise, and "the
specialist's perception of similarity may be different from the lay observer's, the
'ordinary observer' test should be modified to reflect the perspective of' the
targeted audience. Id.
90. Boone v. Jackson, No. 03-CV-8661, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13172, at
*10 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2005). The Second Circuit has tried to synthesize both
the extraction and ordinary observer tests by beginning the infringement inquiry
with the premise that 'total concept and overall feel' are relevant in assessing
claims of inexact copying." Cunard & Keller, supra note 88, at § 11:6.2.
However, first, "the court must dissect the copyrighted work into parts to
determine what is original." Id. "Second, the court must look to whether [ ]
defendant copied aesthetic decisions-- such as selection, coordination, and
arrangement-- made even with respect to the unprotect[a]ble, such as public
domain, elements." Id. "Finally, if there are similarities, the court must assess
whether they are due to the original (that is, the public domain work) or to [ ]
plaintiffs protected expression." Id. "Where [ ] defendant takes such
expression he may be liable even if the 'total concept and feel' of his work is
dissimilar." Id.
91. Boone, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13172, at *10.
2006] 325
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Under the extraction approach, substantial similarity is
determined by only looking at the copyrightable elements of the
works.92 Thus, before evaluating substantial similarity, the fact-
finder extracts any portion of the work that consists of
uncopyrightable material.93 In addition, some circuits have held
that a court must also filter out any protectable elements that either
(1) defendant can establish were independently created or (2)
defendant had permission from plaintiff to use.94 After extracting
the unprotected, permissibly used, and independently created
elements, the fact-finder must then determine whether an "ordinary
observer" would notice substantial similarities between the two
works unless he or she set out to detect them.95 The determination
of "just how 'substantial' the substantial similarity must be
depends on the extent to which the copyrighted work is original."96
If a copyrighted work reflects little creativity, then
"'supersubstantial' similarity must be shown to prove
infringement."97
In BMS, plaintiffs conceded that if the portions of their
composition "Straight Like That" that lacked originality were
removed from consideration, there would be no substantial
similarity between plaintiffs' work and defendants' composition
"Stand Up."' However, the court rejected the extraction test
method and defendants' contention "that, in comparing designs for
copyright infringement, we are required to dissect them into their
separate components, and compare only those elements which are
themselves copyrightable."99 Instead, the court chose to base its
entire analysis on a proposition established in Knitwaves that the
court "should evaluate a work's 'total concept and feel. "'100
92. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
93. Cunard & Keller, supra note 88, at § 11:6.2.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. BMS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13491, at *5.
99. Id. at *9.
100. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995).
However, the Knitwaves court noted that when it is comparing products that
contain both protectable and unprotectable elements, its inspection must be
326
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Yet a week earlier, the same court in Boone v. Jackson applied
the extraction test to a case very similar to BMS.'°' In Boone v.
Jackson, the plaintiff alleged copyright infringement based on the
assertion that the hook in the defendant's composition contained
the repetition of the lyric "holla back" which was similar in
phrasing and musicality to her copyrighted work."°2 The district
court granted summary judgment for defendants on plaintiffs
claim of copyright infringement.' 3 The court held that substantial
similarities did not exist between the hook in plaintiffs song and
the hook in defendant's song to support an inference of copying.'
The district court went further in explaining how it reached its
decision by noting that although "holla back" was protected as a
complete work, not every element of the song was protected per
se." 5 The court found that "the presence of the phrase 'holla
back,' rapped in an eighth note, [an] eighth note, [and] [a] quarter
note rhythmic pattern in the hook of each song was too common to
be protectable.'
0 6
The district court also noted that the "evidence proffered by []
defendant noting the presence of the phrase 'holla back' in
numerous songs demonstrates the banal and, therefore,
unprotectable nature of the phrase." ' 7 The court clearly stated that
"[i]t is black letter law that phrases such as 'holla back' are not
'more discerning;' it must attempt to extract the unprotectable elements from its
"consideration and ask whether the protectable elements, standing alone, are
substantially similar." Id. at 1002. The Knitwaves court focused its "more
discerning" analysis on the means in which defendant appropriated plaintiff's
work, not merely on the fact that plaintiff and defendant expressed the same
idea. Id. The court viewed the means of expression as the "artistic" aspect of
the work. Id. However, the court, in applying the "more discerning" ordinary
observer test, rejected the assertion that when comparing designs for copyright
infringement, it was required to compare only those elements which were by
themselves, protectable. Id. at 1003.
101. Boone, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13172, at *14.
102. Id. at *4.
103. Id. at *19.
104. Id. at * 12.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Boone, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13172, at "12-13.
20061
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protectable."'' 8 Finally, the district court left itself guidance by
noting that "where a comparison of the two works at issue show
that the similarities relate only to non-protectable elements, as is
the case here, courts have consistently held that summary
judgment in favor of [] defendant is appropriate."'' 9 This shows
that the court recognized that when applying the extraction test, if
the plaintiffs only claim is that defendants' work is similar to the
unprotectable elements of the plaintiffs' work, the defendants
should not be found liable of infringement.
BMS and Boone v. Jackson are so analogous that the court
should have decided them in the same manner using the same
approach. In both BMS and Boone, plaintiffs' work contained
protectable and unprotectable elements. Also, in both cases,
plaintiffs' work and defendants' work lacked substantial similarity
when the non-protectable elements of their compositions were
extracted. Therefore, following the approach applied in Boone,
summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the
defendants in BMS.
B. The Knitwaves Approach
Although Boone v. Jackson is not binding, the court should seek
to adhere to a consistent approach when deciding cases that
concern the same issue within the same time period. Yet, the
district court took two different approaches to the same issue in
deciding these two cases within the same time frame. The district
court in BMS relied heavily on Knitwaves v. Lollytogs Ltd."' In
Knitwaves, the court introduced the proposition that "when
comparing works for infringement purposes - whether we employ
the traditional 'ordinary observer' test or the Folio Impressions
'more discerning' inquiry - we examine the works' 'total concept
and feel.""" Folio Impressions was a case involving the copying
108. Id. at *13 (citing but later distinguishing Jean v. Bug Music, Inc., No.
00-CIV-4022, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3176, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2002)).
109. Id. at*14.
110. BMS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24449, at *3-4.
111. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1003; see also Sarah Brashears-Macatee, Total
Concept And Feel Or Dissection?: Approaches To The Misappropriation Test
328
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of a fabric design whose background was copied from a pattern in
the public domain." 2 Applying the extraction test, the court found
that copyright protection only applied to the roses superimposed
on top of the background and their arrangement."3  The court,
looking only at the roses and not the background of the design,
then used the ordinary observer test to find that an ordinary
observer would not conclude that the pattern had been
misappropriated from a copyrighted work."4
In Knitwaves, however, the sweaters at issue were original
creations in their entirety and defendants did not claim that the
plaintiff utilized any unprotectable elements."5 Therefore, in the
same manner that the Knitwaves court distinguished that case from
Folio Impressions in its decision to apply the ordinary observer
test as opposed to the extraction test, the court in BMS should have
distinguished the Knitwaves case because Knitwaves was a
copyright case that contained no unprotectable elements. The fact
that the district court underscores "the highly fact-specific nature
of the inquiry," and then chose to apply the Knitwaves approach to
the BMS case when the two cases do not deal with a similar set of
facts is an error by the court."6 The Knitwaves approach should be
considered inapplicable to copyright infringement cases where the
copyrighted work contains protectable and unprotectable
elements. "'
Of Substantial Similarity, 68 CHI. KENT. L. REv. 913 (1993).
The appeal of the 'totality' infringements approach is evident.
The task of the fact-finder is simplified because it can
examine the work in its entirety, and decide, without much
analysis, whether the subsequent author took 'the heart' of the
original work. There is no need for a careful, refined
separation of fact and expression. Moreover, a 'totality'
approach allows a fact-finder to respond to a visceral feeling
that something unfair was done.
Id.
112. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1003.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1004.
116. BMS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13491, at *11.
117. In Yankee Candle Company Inc., the First Circuit noted that the Second
Circuit suggested, in Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d
2006]
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In BMS, the district court's hypothetical situation posed to the
defendants' counsel as affirmation of the court's reading of
Knitwaves does not provide further support in reaching the
conclusion that the Knitwaves approach should be applicable to
BMS. The court asserts that unoriginal lyrics combined with an
unoriginal melody and an unoriginal reggae beat would meet the
originality requirement provided that the combination of
unoriginal elements was original to the author, and defendants'
counsel agreed.'18 The district court then attempted to attribute
that assertion as consistent with the court's reading of
Cir. 1996), "that the dissection test may not fully resolve the legal issues where
the copyright holder claims that the copyrighted material is essentially a host of
uncopyrightable individual elements that have been arranged in a unique way
that qualifies them for copyright protection." Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v.
Bridgewater Candle Co., LLC., 259 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2001). However, the
First Circuit "has been more enthusiastic than the Second Circuit about the use
of dissection analysis." Id. The First Circuit has found that "[b]y dissecting the
accused work and identifying those features which are protected . . . the court
can also determine ... those aspects of the work that ... should be considered
in the . . . comparative analysis under the ordinary observer test." Id. In
Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., the Second
Circuit attempted to further explain the "total concept and feel" approach.
Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127,
134 (2d Cir. 2003). The Second Circuit explained "while the infringement
analysis must begin by dissecting the copyrighted work into its component parts
in order to clarify precisely what is not original, infringement analysis is not
simply a matter of ascertaining similarity between components viewed in
isolation." Id. This is because:
[] defendant may infringe on [] plaintiffs work not only
through literal copying of a portion of it, but also by parroting
properties that are apparent only when numerous aesthetic
decisions embodied in [] plaintiff's work of art - the
excerpting, modifying, and arranging of public domain
compositions ... are considered in relation to one another....
The court, confronted with an allegedly infringing work, must
analyze the two works closely to figure out in what respects, if
any, they are similar, and then determine whether these
similarities are due to protected aesthetic expressions original
to the allegedly infringing work, or whether the similarity is to
something in the original that is free for the taking.
Id.
118. Id.at*10.
330
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Knitwaves."9  However, one need not turn to Knitwaves to
determine whether the combination of unprotectable elements
would produce a protectable work. Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Services Co. has long stood for the proposition
that the arrangement of unprotectable elements may receive
copyright protection if the arrangement is sufficiently original. 2
The arrangement in the hypothetical in BMS would be sufficiently
original based on the specific facts of the hypothetical- Mary Had
a Little Lamb lyrics, Old McDonald melody, and reggae beat-
because the combination was novel and had never been done
before, not just because three unprotected elements were
combined. Therefore, while a work's total concept and feel should
be evaluated in general, courts have consistently held that when
evaluating works that contain protectable and unprotectable
elements - and where, as is the case here, a comparison of the two
works at issue shows that the similarities relate only to non-
protectable elements - summary judgment in favor of defendant is
appropriate."'
C. The "Total Concept and Feel" Approach is Unworkable in
Music Copyright Cases
When the "total concept and feel" approach was first introduced
as a means to evaluating infringement, the approach was limited to
graphic works.'22 The trier of fact was able to compare the two
119. Id.
120. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1991).
121. Boone, 2005 U.S. Dist. 13172, at *14.
122. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.03(A)(1)(c) (2005); see also Roth Greeting Cards v. United
Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970). The court stated that:
[t]o constitute an infringement under the Act there must be
substantial similarity between the infringing work and the
work copyrighted; and that similarity must have been caused
by the defendant's having copied the copyright holder's
creation. The protection is thus against copying -- not against
any possible infringement caused when an independently
created work coincidentally duplicates copyrighted material..
. . It appears to us that in total concept and feel the cards of
United are the same as the copyrighted cards of Roth. With
2006]
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visual works side-by-side and determine if the alleged infringing
work possessed enough of the elements of the original copyrighted
work to constitute infringement.'23 It is important to point out that
the "total concept and feel" approach as applied in graphic works
cases, merely required the trier of fact to evaluate the works as an
"ordinary observer" with the presumption that on its face the
infringement would be apparent.'24 The "total concept and feel"
approach was then extended and applied in the comparison of
juvenile books.'25 Again, the court noted the simplicity of the
works being compared.'26 Therefore, the court determined that it
could properly consider the "total concept and feel" of the works
in addition to its application of pattern analysis.'27
the possible exception of one United card . . . the characters
depicted in the art work, the mood they portrayed, the
combination of art work conveying a particular mood with a
particular message, and the arrangement of the words on the
greeting card are substantially the same as in Roth's cards.
Id.
123. Id. (noting that "[i]t is true, as the trial court found, that each of
United's cards employed art work somewhat different from that used in the
corresponding Roth cards. 'The test of infringement is whether the work is
recognizable by an ordinary observer as having been taken from the copyrighted
source."'); Roth Greeting Cards, 429 F.2d at 1110; see also White-Smith Music
Pub. Co. v. Apollo Company, 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1907) (noting that "[a] copy is
that which comes so near to the original as to give to every person seeing it the
idea created by the original."); see also Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 287 F.2d 478, 485 (9th Cir. 1961) (noting that "[s]light differences
and variations will not serve as a defense.").
124. Id. "The remarkable similarity between the Roth and United cards in
issue ... is apparent to even a casual observer."
125. See Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.
1976) (stating that "[t]herefore, in addition to the essential sequence of events,
we might properly consider the "total concept and feel" of the works in
question.") (citing Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106,
1110 (9th Cir. 1970)).
126. Id. (noting that "[w]e must first note that both stories, intended for
children, are necessarily less complex than some other works submitted to
pattern analysis.").
127. Id. The court stated that:
[t]he difficult task in an infringement action is to distill the
nonprotected idea from protected expression. In Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2 Cir.
22
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However, when comparing two works that are not similar on
their face, the "total concept and feel" approach is unworkable and
the dissection/extraction method should be used. Applying the
extraction method in copyright cases where infringement is not
readily apparent is the only logical method to determine whether
or not infringement exists. Courts should not look to concepts
when determining infringement because concepts are not
protectable under the Copyright Act. 2 ' Further, evaluating a
works "feel" does not provide a framework for any analysis.
Triers of fact are left to gauge "feel" in their own personal way;
however, determinations of copyright infringement should be
made within a set framework of analysis in order to adhere to the
requirements of the Act."9
1930), 282 U.S. 902, 75 L. Ed. 795, 51 S. Ct. 216 (1931),
Judge Learned Hand articulated his 'abstractions test' by
noting that 'upon any work ... a great number of patterns of
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more
of the incident is left out .... There is a point in this series of
abstractions where they are no longer protected, since
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas' to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended.' Attempting to further delineate this boundary, one
commentator has stated that 'protection covers the 'pattern' of
the work . . . the sequence of events and the development of
the interplay of characters.'
Id.
128. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2005) (stating that "[i]n no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work.") (emphasis added).
129. See Reyher, 533 F.2d at 90-91. The court stated that:
[i]t is an axiom of copyright law that the protection granted to
a copyrightable work extends only to the particular expression
of an idea and never to the idea itself. . . . This principle
attempts to reconcile two competing societal interests:
rewarding an individual's ingenuity and effort while at the
same time permitting the nation to benefit from further
improvements or progress resulting from others' use of the
same subject matter. 'In the case of verbal 'works' it is well
settled that although the 'proprietor's' monopoly extends
beyond an exact reproduction of the words, there can be no
23
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As noted earlier, the court in BMS rejected the proposition that
the court must first extract the unprotectable elements and then
compare only the protectable elements of a work. 3 ' Instead, the
district court chose to rely on the Knitwaves approach and evaluate
the "total concept and feel" of the work as a whole.'31 Again,
Knitwaves involved graphic works. 3 ' However, other courts
evaluating copyright infringement relating to graphic works have
realized that the Knitwaves approach is inadequate even as it
applies to graphic works and have sought to rehabilitate the
approach."' The Second Circuit recognized that in order to apply
copyright in the 'ideas' disclosed but only in their 'expression.'
Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator
has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its
'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.'
Id. (citing Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2
Cir. 1960) (L. Hand)).
130. BMS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13491, at *9.
131. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1003.
132. Id.
133. See Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, 338 F.3d at 134-35. The court
stated that:
[s]ome commentators have worried that the "total concept and
feel" standard may 'invite[] an abdication of analysis,'
because 'feel' can seem a 'wholly amorphous referent.' . . .
Likewise, one may wonder whether a copyright doctrine
whose aspiration is to protect a work's 'concept' could end up
erroneously protecting 'ideas.' But our caselaw is not so
incautious. Where we have described possible infringement in
terms of whether two designs have or do not have a
substantially similar 'total concept and feel,' we generally
have taken care to identify precisely the particular aesthetic
decisions -- original to the plaintiff and copied by the
defendant -- that might be thought to make the designs similar
in the aggregate. . . . Essentially, the total-concept-and-feel
locution functions as a reminder that, while the infringement
analysis must begin by dissecting the copyrighted work into its
component parts in order to clarify precisely what is not
original, infringement analysis is not simply a matter of
ascertaining similarity between components viewed in
isolation. For the defendant may infringe on the plaintiffs
work not only through literal copying of a portion of it, but
also by parroting properties that are apparent only when
334
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the "total concept and feel" approach, the court was still required
to extract the non-protectable elements as the first step in its
analysis. "'
In addition, "total concept and feel" is unworkable in music
cases because more often than not, the two works to be compared
are not literally similar; therefore, substantial similarity cannot be
determined by merely listening to them.'3 5 Further, "the fact that
the sampled material is played throughout defendants' song cannot
establish liability, if that snippet constitutes an insubstantial
portion of plaintiffs composition." '36 Therefore, in music cases,
the court must often implement a more in-depth analysis when
numerous aesthetic decisions embodied in the plaintiffs work
of art -- the excerpting, modifying, and arranging of public
domain compositions, if any, together with the development
and representation of wholly new motifs and the use of texture
and color, etc. -- are considered in relation to one another. The
court, confronted with an allegedly infringing work, must
analyze the two works closely to figure out in what respects, if
any, they are similar, and then determine whether these
similarities are due to protected aesthetic expressions original
to the allegedly infringed work, or whether the similarity is to
something in the original that is free for the taking.
Id. (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(A)(2). Nimmer states that::
[w]here there is literal similarity (virtually, though not
necessarily, completely word for word) between plaintiffs and
defendant's works ... it is not necessary to determine the level
of abstraction at which similarity ceases to consist of an
'expression of ideas,' because literal similarity by definition is
always a similarity as to the expression of ideas. But suppose
the similarity, although literal, is not comprehensive -- that is,
the fundamental substance, or skeleton or overall scheme, of
the plaintiffs work has not been copied; no more than a line,
or a paragraph, or a page or chapter of the copyrighted work
has been appropriated. At what point does such fragmented
similarity become substantial so as to constitute the borrowing
an infringement? ...In any given case, this question cannot
be answered without a consideration of the purpose for which
the defendant's work will be used.
Id.
136. Id.
2006] 335
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determining substantial similarity by comparing musical works.'37
Without applying the extraction method, courts cannot
competently make a determination of infringement in music cases.
The court's lack of competency is directly related to the various
levels of analysis that the court must utilize in order to evaluate
infringement within the music context. 138
137. Id. Nimmer states that:
[t]he quantitative relation of the similar material to the total
material contained in plaintiffs work is certainly of
importance. However, even if the similar material is
quantitatively small, if it is qualitatively important, the trier of
fact may properly find substantial similarity .... In general..
. the defendant may not claim immunity on the grounds that
the infringement 'is such a little one.' If, however, the
similarity is only as to nonessential matters, then a finding of
no substantial similarity should result. That scenario could
unfold to the extent that defendant copied a small amount of
plaintiffs text or of entries from plaintiffs compilation, or
sampled a two-second portion of plaintiffs sound recording,
or to the extent that the subject reproduction is fleeting and
out-of-focus. It follows, then, that the determination of
substantial similarity with respect to fragmented literal
similarity . . . requires a value judgment. The guiding
principle was . . . '[i]f so much is taken that the value of the
original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original
author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by
another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute a piracy
pro tanto.' But this oft-repeated principle does not tell the
trier of fact when in any given instance the value of the
original is sensibly diminished or injuriously appropriated.
The trier must ultimately determine the importance of that
material that is common to both parties' works.
Id.
138. Id. Nimmer states that:
the qualitative importance for a given quantity of similar
material may well vary according to the type of work in
question. . . . in a musical composition, ordinarily, similarity
must be found in more than a brief and commonplace musical
sequence, or merely in motif. However, similarity in the
accompaniment, but not in the melody, has been held
sufficient to constitute an infringement. . . . Although . . .
similarity limited to a single note never suffices [to constitute
infringement], the superstition among many musicians that the
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The "total concept and feel" approach is also problematic in
music cases because it requires the trier of fact to evaluate the
work as an "ordinary observer," which can only be accomplished
in the context of graphic works because music cannot be
"observed."' 39 However, the "ordinary observer" test has become
synonymous with the "audience test" in music cases and is an
attempt to apply the "reasonable person doctrine" employed in
other areas of the law such as torts, corporate and criminal law to
copyright law. 4 ' When applying the "reasonable person doctrine,"
"the trier [of fact] is asked to compare the defendant's actions with
what the trier's own (presumably reasonably prudent) actions
would be under the same circumstances."'' However, in music
cases, the trier of fact is not competent enough to place his or
herself into the defendant's shoes.'42 The trier of fact lacks
competency to evaluate music infringement using the "audience
test" because the trier "cannot meaningfully answer whether, if he
were in the defendant's shoes, he would have been constrained to
copy from the plaintiff in order to achieve the given result.'
' 43
"Therefore, the trier is directed to answer the only question he can
answer-does the result of the defendant's work give appearances
of having been copied from the plaintiff?"'44  However, trier of
fact's impression of copyright infringement is not sufficient in
itself to constitute actual infringement. 45  Conversely, merely
copying of three bars from a musical work can never
constitute an infringement is... without foundation.... [T]he
evaluation must occur in the context of each case, both
qualitatively and quantitatively. The practice of digitally
sampling prior music to use in a new composition should not
be subject to any special analysis: to the extent that the
resulting product is substantially similar to the sampled
original, liability should result.
Id.
139. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
140. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(E)(2).
141. Id. "Thus, in a negligence case, the trier puts himself into the
defendant's shoes, not the shoes of an "ordinary observer" of the accident."
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. "[T]his leads us back to the dead end of audience impression of
2006]
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because the trier of fact does not readily perceive infringement
does not mean that the infringement does not actually exist.'46
Therefore, because the "total concept and feel" approach requires
the trier of fact to base his or her analysis on the appearance of
infringement rather than engaging in an analysis to determine the
actual existence of infringement, the approach is unworkable in the
music context.
The court has previously addressed the issue of determining the
appropriate test for evaluating musical compositions where two
competing approaches exist. In Bridgeport Music, Inc., v.
Dimension Films, the court was called to determine whether the
qualitative/quantitative de minimis test or the "fragmented literal
similarity" approach should be used when determining copyright
infringement in copyright cases involving sound recordings.'47
The district court applied the de minimis test and concluded that
the portion copied in defendant's work was insignificant and,
therefore, it did not constitute infringement.'48 Plaintiff argued on
theft, not to the theft itself. Can there be literary theft without an immediate and
spontaneous detection by the ordinary observer? If this question can be
answered in the affirmative, then, obviously, the audience test is inadequate."
146. 4 NfMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(E)(2) (noting that "the immediate
and spontaneous observations of a person untrained in the special requirements
and techniques of the play, the novel, the short story, the motion picture, and
most especially, the computer, may fail to note similarities that, if analyzed and
dissected, would be only too apparent."); see also id. n.224:
Although dissection and expert testimony is not favored, the
judicially created ordinary observer test should not deprive
authors of this significant statutory grant merely because the
technical requirements of a different medium dictate certain
differences in expression. Without deciding the question, we
note that in some cases it may be important to educate the trier
of fact as to such considerations in order to preserve the
author's rights under the Copyright Act.
(citing Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607,
618 n.12 (7th Cir. 1982) (Treatise cited) (emphasis original), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 880 (1982)).
147. See Bridgeport Music Inc., 410 F.3d 792, 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
148. Id. at 797-98. The court stated that::
the district court found the de minimis analysis was a
derivation of the substantial similarity element when a
defendant claims that the literal copying of a small and
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appeal that no substantial similarity or de minimis test should be
used in evaluating copying infringement when defendant admits to
copying or digitally sampling the sound recording. 4 9 The Sixth
Circuit agreed.'
The court found that the substantial similarity test used to
determine copyright infringement relating to musical compositions
was inappropriate when relating to sound recordings because the
scope of inquiry was narrower.' It is important to highlight that
when determining the appropriate test, the court noted its "limited
technological knowledge in this specialized field, [therefore, its]
opinion [was] limited to an instance of digital sampling of a sound
recording protected by a valid copyright."' 52 The court also noted
that "[a]dvances in technology coupled with the advent of the
popularity of hip hop or rap music have made instances of digital
sampling extremely common and have spawned a plethora of
copyright disputes and litigation."'5 3  Therefore, the court
concluded that "[t]he music industry, as well as the courts, [were]
best served if something approximating a bright-line test can be
established."' 54 "Not necessarily a 'one size fits all' test, but one
that, at least, adds clarity to what constitutes actionable
infringement with regard to the digital sampling of copyrighted
insignificant portion of the copyrighted work should be
allowed. After listening to the copied segment, the sample,
and both songs, the district court found that no reasonable
juror, even one familiar with the works of [composer/artist],
would recognize the source of the sample without having been
told of its source. This finding, coupled with findings
concerning the quantitatively small amount of copying
involved and the lack of qualitative similarity between the
works, led the district court to conclude that [plaintiff] could
not prevail on its claims for copyright infringement of the
sound recording.
Id.
149. Id. at 798.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Bridgeport Music Inc., 410 F.3d at 798-99.
154. Id. at 799.
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sound recordings."'55
The same argument used in Bridgeport Music Inc. is appropriate
when comparing the extraction and "total concept and feel"
approaches with regard to copyright cases relating to music. In
music copyright cases, the scope of inquiry should be more narrow
than in infringement cases involving graphic works. Because the
court has limited knowledge in the specialized field of music, it is
important for the court to utilize all of the tools available to it in
order for the court to reach a sound decision. By applying the
extraction method, courts will be better able to analyze the
similarity of works that do not sound similar to an ordinary
listener; however, when the extraction/dissection test is applied,
similarities become apparent.'56 Therefore, the extraction method
is a superior approach to evaluating music copyright cases than the
"total concept and feel" approach because the "total concept and
feel" approach provides no set framework for analysis and,
therefore, its application could result in an increase in litigation
costs and a slower resolution of disputes due to the uncertainty the
approach creates when applied to music copyright cases. '57
Applying the "total concept and feel" approach to music cases
also poses the potential risk that the court may conclude
infringement contrary to public policy. The purpose of the
Copyright Act is clear: "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." '58 Therefore, granting copyright protection (property
rights status) to common phrases, mere ideas, or concepts would
155. Id.
156. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
157. Contra Bridgeport Music Inc., 410 F.3d at 804. The court noted that:
[i]t is believed, however, that the courts should take what
appears to be a rare opportunity to follow a 'bright line' rule
specifically mandated by Congress. This would result in a
substantial reduction of litigation costs and uncertainty
attending disputes over sampling infringement of sound
recordings and would promote a faster resolution of these
disputes.
Id.
158. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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also "permit withdrawing [them] from the stock of materials that
would otherwise be open to other authors, thereby narrowing the
field of thought open for development and exploitation."'59 "This
effect, it is reasoned, would hinder, rather than promote, the
professed purpose of the copyright laws."' 6 ° This is particularly
true as it pertains to common phrases that have developed and
acquired meaning through cultural integration. 6' In these cases, it
is the public itself that attributed meaning to the phrases; therefore,
no one should be granted property rights over its use.'62
D. The District Court Failed To Address the Facts of the Case
In BMS, the issue before the court was whether lyrics that
159. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(B)(2)(a).
160. Id. Nimmmer states that:
[t]he Ninth Circuit warns that 'we must be careful in
copyright cases not to cheat the public domain. Only by
vigorously policing the line between idea and expression can
we ensure both that artists receive due reward for their
original creations and that proper latitude is granted other
artists to make use of ideas that properly belong to us all.'
Indeed, it has been said that copyright protection is granted for
the very reason that it may persuade authors to make their
ideas freely accessible to the public so that they may be used
for the intellectual advancement of mankind.
Id.
161. See supra text accompanying note 62.
162. It can also further be argued that common phrases that have developed
and acquired meaning through cultural integration have undergone a "merger"
of idea and expression and, therefore, a common phrase is inseparably tied to a
particular expression.
In such instances, rigorously protecting the expression would
confer a monopoly over the idea itself, in contravention of the
statutory command. To prevent that consequence, courts have
invoked the merger doctrine. In other words, given the
dilemma either of protecting original expression, even when
that protection can be leveraged to grant an effective
monopoly over the idea thus expressed, or of making the idea
free to all with the concomitant result that the plaintiff loses
effective copyright protection, even over the precise original
expression used, copyright law chooses the latter course.
4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(A)(3).
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combine a call-and-response format, the phrase "like that"
preceded by a one-syllable word, and a rhythmic pattern consisting
of three notes - an eighth note, a quarter note, and an eighth note -
was sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection.163 The
court, however, never addressed that issue. Instead, the court
focused a large part of its analysis on defendants' attempt to
distinguish BMS from the Knitwaves case by asserting that the
unprotectable elements in plaintiffs' composition ("straight like
that" in a call-and-response format accompanied by a rhythm
substantially similar to that of plaintiffs') were similar to an earlier
composition by another artist and, therefore, plaintiffs'
arrangement was unoriginal and unprotectable.'64 However, it does
not seem that defendants' defense was based solely upon that one
argument. The court seems to give defendants' attempt to show
that the phrase "straight like that" is not only commonly used, but
has been used in combination with a rhythmic pattern substantially
similar to plaintiffs' use, too much attention.'65
The district court seemed to suggest that if defendants had
shown plaintiffs' access to the prior artist's composition,
defendants would have been successful in proving that the
combination of unprotectable elements was not sufficiently
original and, therefore, not copyrightable' 66 The next step in the
analysis would be that if plaintiffs' composition is not
copyrightable, there would be no infringement. However, that
issue was not before the court. By applying the Knitwaves
approach improperly, and looking at the "total concept and feel" of
the work, the court failed to reach the issue in this case. Had the
court applied the extraction test, by plaintiffs' own admission, no
substantial similarity would have been found between plaintiffs'
composition and defendants' composition.'67
The court's failure to reach the specific issue of the case further
illustrates how the Knitwaves approach is unworkable in copyright
cases where the copyrighted work contains protectable and
163. BMS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13491, at *14.
164. Id. at*l1-12.
165. Id. at*lI 1- 13.
166. Id. at * 13.
167. Id. at*5.
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unprotectable elements. However, the decision in BMS does not
even appear to follow the Knitwaves approach. Both parties
submitted expert testimony that attempted to compare the
musicality of the two compositions. 68 Both experts agree that the
only similarities between the two compositions are a three-note
rhythmic pattern combined with a one-syllable word proceeding
the phrase "like that" in a call-and-response format. 169
Even if the court found that the combination of three
unprotectable elements constitutes enough originality for a valid
copyright, under Feist, copyright protection only extends to a
particular arrangement and others are free to use the same
unprotectable elements with a new arrangement regardless of
whether it is similar.' ° Copyright protection does not prevent
subsequent users from copying those constituent elements that are
not original, such as materials in the public domain, from a prior
author's work as long as such use does not unfairly appropriate the
prior author's original contributions. 7'
In BMS, both parties utilized a three-note rhythmic pattern;
however, only a finite number of combinations of notes are
available. It would arguably be against public policy to grant the
plaintiffs a monopoly on the utilization of an eighth note, a quarter
note, and another eighth note combination in a hook of a song, or
the call-and-response format, or the phrase "like that" by
themselves. Yet the court concluded that it could not rule as a
matter of law that their combination was not sufficiently original
to be copyrightable.' However, that is not the question the court
was called upon to reach.
D. Impact
The district court's decision in BMS goes against its own
decision reached one week prior in Boone.'73 This court attempted
168. Id. at*8.
169. BMS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13491, at *8.
170. Feist, 499 U.S. at 350.
171. Id.
172. BMS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13491, at *14.
173. Boone, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13172, at *1-2.
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to adopt an unworkable approach in the highly fact-specific area of
copyright infringement based upon a case that should be
distinguished from BMS. As a result, by not addressing the issue,
this decision is likely to create more confusion in the Second
Circuit concerning the extension of copyright protection to the
underlying unprotectable elements of a copyrighted work that
contains both protectable and unprotectable elements.
As noted earlier, while the Second Circuit has sought to
synthesize the extraction and "ordinary observer" tests, when
evaluating substantial similarity in copyright infringement cases,
this approach has proven very problematic. This is especially true
when the work a court is evaluating contains protectable and non-
protectable elements. While the "total concept and feel" approach
may be a good gauge to compare works after all unprotectable,
permissibly used, and independently created elements are
extracted, the "total concept and feel" approach leaves too much
discretion to the trier of fact. This discretion will lead to more
inconsistent results among the courts and within the Second
Circuit.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision in BMS and the denial of defendants' motion for
reconsideration signal a shift in the way the courts in the Second
Circuit will view copyright infringement cases concerning works
that contain protectable and unprotectable elements. By adopting
the Knitwaves approach, the court created confusion in how the
cases should be analyzed. The "total concept and feel" approach
also offers little guidance to the courts and gives a vast amount of
discretion when analyzing cases. This will likely lead to more
inconsistent rulings concerning these copyright infringement cases.
BMS will likely be viewed as a step backwards in the area of
copyright law. Although the courts should look at the "total
concept and feel" as an overarching umbrella, application of the
extraction approach is essential to maintaining uniformity among
the courts.
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